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SUPPORT FOR HOUSING REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION:

PROGRESS AND ISSUES

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ONU  **HABITAT**
POUR UN MEILLEUR AVENIR URBAIN

The following report is based on the figures provided by shelter and housing implementing agencies to a combined request for data by the Emergency Shelter, Camp Coordination Camp Management cluster / Logement Quartiers mid December 2011, by IOM and UN-HABITAT.

The full data on repairs and reconstruction, planned and completed, is available by agency and by commune. UN-HABITAT is reporting the results of the data provided on progress and commitments in permanent housing repairs, reconstruction and associated activities. The data has been supplemented by qualitative information provided by implementing agencies, and site visits. The agencies involved have played a key role in accelerating long term housing solutions and restoring normal life for families and communities and while the numbers repaired and reconstructed may be less than everyone would hope for, each one represents a considerable achievement.

More detailed reporting of housing related WASH and other activities may be found through their respective coordination platforms.

We acknowledge the report has some significant gaps in information from major actors, particularly in regard to donor future plans and commitments.

This report also does not account for the considerable repair and reconstruction work underway by earthquake affected households themselves without agency involvement, particularly in rural areas, in existing neighbourhoods and increasingly in expansion areas on the periphery of the city. The reporting process in December with partners was focused on agency activities and did not include collecting information on auto-reconstruction. We would like to note that this merits dedicated reporting and analysis.

There have been valuable lessons learned by agencies who moved early into repairs, reconstruction and neighbourhood upgrading. The good practices, tools and resources need to inform policy and programme development, likewise the challenges and field issues arising need to be compiled for discussion and resolution as part of policy and programme development.

The document is separated into:

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1. Common Issues

 2. Repairs

 3. Reconstruction



Model House by J/P HRO + FAU at Delmas 32

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1. Common Issues

■ Projects and Programmes

Activities in support for housing repair and reconstruction in Haiti may be described as a series of separate projects rather than a common programme. They are characterised by individual project names and agency names instead of a coordinated programme considering coherence or consistency. The absence of political leadership in housing reconstruction and policy directives resulted in a generally laissez-faire approach. Despite the absence of formal policy directives, Government, UN and NGO actors in the sector have managed to develop and implement coherent approaches, for example, in terms of returns to neighbourhoods and the adoption of participatory enumeration as a common methodology. Government leadership, direction and coordination are expected to move to a new phase with the establishment of the new UCLBP under the Prime Minister's Office. Unité de Construction du Logement et des Bâtiments Publics / Unit for Construction of Housing and Public Buildings

■ Eligibility, targeting, coverage and gaps

The project based approach has also meant some areas and communities are advancing with technical and financial support and other areas are receiving less or none. The selection of areas has largely been a consequence of previous presence in emergency activities including shelter, development programmes initiated prior to the earthquake or targeted selections like 16 / 6. It is important to review strategic questions of eligibility, coverage, gaps, targeting, prioritisation including area wise, but also subsector wise, (eg rental reconstruction). Improved coordination including information management should help to provide the basis for improved policy decision making and hopefully improved optimisation of resources in the next phase.

■ Enabling approaches

The majority of agencies involved in the emergency shelter response (including T-shelter) operated on a direct provision approach, with construction by their own teams, contractors or local labour, to agency defined parameters. The context for housing is substantially different with the need to hand over responsibility and decision making to households, landlords and communities themselves to drive the reconstruction and development process. This has implications for programme design and implementation, and changes the activities and skills sets from logistics strengths to training and awareness skills and experience. Many agencies are concerned about the technical responsibility implied in this role. There is a pattern of outsourcing the activities to a few specialised organisations instead of assuming responsibility by many agencies themselves to increase their own capacity in training and promotion and thereby the total technical support capacity. The lack of a training strategy, common curricula

and resources has been a contributing factor, and the development of some should hopefully improve the situation, including training of trainers and broadening the range of trainings for wider target groups and therefore the range of potential contributions different agencies can make in overall capacity building.

The majority of agencies listed as active in housing repairs and housing reconstruction are international NGOs, with or without long standing previous experience in Haiti. While the progress in repairs and reconstruction is generally reported in their names, it is important to note that they are usually working in close collaboration with Haitian NGOs, private sector or professional partners, who provide inputs varying from community mobilisation and selection of beneficiaries to technical advice and implementation activities. There is not however a concerted approach to partnership, capacity building or the long term roles of national organisations. It is important to note that few agencies were experienced in housing or urban reconstruction, but moved from shelter programmes or development activities to respond to the massive needs outstanding in this sector. Their willingness to commit to accompany affected families to permanent housing and neighbourhood solutions even with limited resources is significant, as technical and community support capacity will be needed to support Government interventions for the next few years at least. The majority of agencies and especially new agencies have proven themselves active and open in seeking and using advice, advancing and testing solutions, sharing information and cooperating with state and non-state actors. Their individual and combined roles can be more effective as part of a wider and common programme, and can be improved by increased back stopping, guidance and coordination.

■ Institutional

There are multiple institutional questions arising throughout the projects underway and under development. These include the roles of existing and new Government authorities, and the roles of area based and technical Government authorities. It will be an important in the next phase of reconstruction to better define parameters for implementing agencies, including terms of engagement with authorities; municipalities and technical ministries with mutual benefits in terms of time management, clarity and consistency.

In general terms the assumption of leadership in reconstruction by the Haitian authorities requires the strengthening and development of those authorities, but equally an appreciation and agreement by implementing agencies of the need to support this process through the planning and implementation of their activities.

2. Repairs

The 2010 earthquake damage to housing resulted in around 175,000 to be repaired and retrofitted or reconstructed. It was a key priority to ensure reparable buildings were made safe and habitable, reducing risk of further damage, increasing the available safe housing stock and reducing displacement.

However, in 2010 the majority of donors and implementing agencies focused on emergency shelter with less emphasis on repairs. 2,546 repairs were carried out to the end of 2010. By June 2011 this rose to 5,315 completed of 12,184 planned. By the end of 2011, the number increased further to 13,831 repairs and retrofits completed by agencies of 25,472 planned.

The figure of 13,831 does not include the large number of families who have carried out their own repairs and retrofitting, with their own resources, mainly without technical advice or assistance.

■ Participation of agencies:

The Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication (MTPTC) issued guidance for repairs at the start of 2011. Guidance for retrofitting has also been prepared and will be released at the start of 2012. Training has been available for repairs and retrofitting during 2011.

The separation between repairing and retrofitting advice and the delay in providing retrofitting advice may have contributed to the confusion and lack of confidence among NGOs towards planning or implementing programmes. Many donors and NGOs also expressed reticence since the start of the recovery in relation to supporting repairs or retrofitting works, due to concerns over liability, responsibility, technical capacity, anticipated costs and other project management issues. A significant number of NGOs were interested to support repairs and retrofitting works, but found difficulties to convince or reassure their management of the feasibility or to secure donor funding.

At the end of 2011 out of over 60 agencies who were originally involved in shelter activities reporting to the shelter cluster, 28 agencies had repair or retrofitting works underway or committed. This includes two agencies; PADF (11,170) and CORDAID (2,955) who are planning to implement 14,125, or over half the 25,472 committed repairs and retrofits.

■ Costs:

13,831 repairs and retrofits represents an investment of around 20 million USD, at an average cost of 1,500 USD per household.

Repairs to small and rural houses have been less expensive, from 200 USD upwards. Repairs to complex, larger and urban buildings have been more expensive, up to 2-4,000 USD.

Retrofitting work has been more expensive than repair work, involving more engineering input, from assessment to design

and implementation of retrofitting measures, and more construction work. Retrofitting frequently requires invasive work, partial demolition and additional structural elements. Costs vary widely according to the size and condition of building and scope of work. The decision about the feasibility of repair and retrofitting is based also on structural safety and stability, replacement costs and beneficiary inputs. Overall 1,500 USD is a working average of construction costs for repairs and retrofits, apart from the technical support costs and other overheads. See 'implementation' below.

■ Red, Yellow and Green and eligibility:

In 2010 MTPTC carried out an extensive building habitability assessment of 400,000 buildings, tagging them as green (safe to live in), yellow (limited access due to safety issues and in need of repairs before they can be considered safe to live in), red (not safe to live in or access). Over 88% of buildings assessed were housing. The result of the assessment was 46% green, 29% yellow, and 25% red. This assessment was extremely important to provide authorised technical assurance to households on whether to enter and use their buildings or not, and to optimise the occupancy of safe buildings. However, the survey was specifically based on the current safety status of buildings, and was not intended as a categorisation of works required. For example, a number of red tagged buildings had deficiencies that made them unsafe for use, but could be technically and economically repaired and retrofitted. Likewise a number of yellow tagged houses required extensive works and might prove technically and financially more feasible to replace. Green tagged buildings were designated as safe for use, but many required retrofitting to increase the structural safety for the longer term, and particularly if additional stories were planned. As the safety survey was relatively comprehensive, the figures, particularly of red and yellow tagged buildings have been used a planning proxy, with red considered as collapsed or to be demolished and replaced, and yellow to be repaired or retrofitted. This proxy has been used as to inform overall shelter and housing sector planning figures. There has been no Government policy determining eligibility criteria for financial or technical support for housing reconstruction or housing repairs and retrofitting. There have been some detailed assessments carried out to determine the works required for the buildings tagged in the safety assessment, including by MTPTC, and in pilot areas of affected quarters including Villa Rosa and Delmas 19 by implementing agencies. These assessments show that there is considerable discrepancy in drawing a direct correlation between red houses and reconstruction, or yellow houses and repairs / retrofits. The detailed assessments and subsequent repair and retrofitting programmes included repair and retrofitting to a proportionately high number of red houses, along with yellow houses.

The issue of determining eligibility and programming works has been usefully documented by small pilot projects and should inform policy decision making before there is an up scaling of housing support programme planning and implementation. There are implications for both yellow and red houses and for repair / retrofitting and for replacement / reconstruction.

The issue of eligibility will also need to address the status of households who have already carried out repair and / or retrofitting works, which may have been executed to an acceptable standard or may need further measures. Some area support programmes to date include the retrofitting of substandard new houses, but this represents a potentially large and unanticipated caseload.

■ Implementation

Repair and retrofitting projects are being implemented through a range of approaches, including:

- Direct contract by agency teams
- Direct contract by non-local or local agency selected contractors
- Owner selected contractors / local labour with technical and financial support by agencies

In the majority of projects decisions about scope of works, specification, selection of materials, selection of boss mason and cost are determined by the agency, with varying degrees of consultation with the house owner. The responsibility for the quality of the work lies predominantly with the agency, although in the case of owners selecting contractors, there is a degree of shared responsibility. Certification of the work and therefore the safety of the building is being carried out by agencies themselves in some cases and by MTPTC in others. It is important to be aware that improving the life-safety of existing buildings is the objective rather than necessarily assuming the building must reach code compliance. Engineering judgement on cost-benefit of improvement works is critical.

For most agencies the scope of works determines the budget, with different costs for different scopes of work and different houses. This means higher cost for more complex works and / or for larger houses, lower budgets for simpler works and smaller houses. The implications are considerable; project management requirements in the initial costing, in execution and reporting, and a higher subsidy for those with larger properties. The directly implemented or contracted work does not tend to leverage private resources. Assuming full responsibility for the cost of works and a varying scale for costs, along with the nature of the work can lead to budget variations, and extensive reconciliation in the accounts and reporting.

In projects where the amount of funding is at a fixed rate for all households, the scope of works carried out may be reduced, or the owner may need to contribute resources, or in cases where the budget is greater than the structural

works require, technical advice may be provided to invest balance funds into other housing improvements including sanitation, rainwater management etc, or the household is at liberty to use the balance as they wish.

Cordaid and Build Change in Villa Rosa are carrying out repair and retrofit work using stage payments of financial assistance to house owners, through bank transfers. This subsidy approach is leveraging additional investment by some house owners themselves, pooling agency and owner funding and increasing the overall budget available. The subsidy approach does not require reconciliation of all expenditure, reporting is based on finance disbursed and works completed only. This is also a valuable lesson for new housing construction.

■ Technical assistance, capacity and training

In 2010 there was very limited engineering capacity in repair and retrofitting among implementing agencies. The majority of technical staff in shelter agencies were experienced in and involved in shelter construction, but did not have expertise or experience in earthquake resistant construction, building vulnerability assessment, repair and retrofit design or implementation. This has increased during 2011, through training and gaining on-job experience.

The extensive work carried out by MTPTC teams in the building habitability assessment generated a valuable basis for diagnosing common defects, and a corps of engineers with field experience of building performance and failure, many of whom now work for a range of implementing agencies.

However, engineering capacity for the full range of reconstruction support activities including repair and retrofitting is still relatively limited and expensive and needs to be optimised. After a human resource intensive research, development and training phase during 2011 agencies are finding efficiencies in repeat specifications, and reduced supervision as implementing teams gain experience. The typical costs of technical assistance and overheads in repair and retrofitting programmes should be reviewed and rationalised.

The majority of agencies are carrying out technical training activities with local boss masons in advance of repair and retrofit programmes in order to increase the local workforce for employment in the project. It is also important to invest in training and awareness activities with affected and unaffected households. Many households in the community may not be affected by the 2010 earthquake, but can benefit from available technical advice to undertake retrofitting works.

Training and awareness activities should not be disaggregated to focus on repair and retrofitting only, but should be in the context of safer building, including site selection and preparation, quality assurance of materials, workmanship, new construction, extensions etc. It was observed in two projects that soon after the agency completed repairs, the household constructed new room

extensions which were substandard and showed no adoption of safer building advice.

■ Conclusion

The slow start to reconstruction of new permanent houses has meant that many agencies decided to invest in support for repair and retrofitting first. There has been valuable funding and technical assistance available to optimise existing building stock, reducing demolition and replacement. Repair and retrofitting do not usually receive such high attention in post disaster recoveries. Many agencies and technical staff prefer to work on new

construction. Repairs and retrofitting works also offer the advantage of avoiding site acquisition, which has been a major preoccupation of many agencies intending to construct new houses.

In Haiti, there have been earlier and more opportunities for work in repair and retrofitting than new construction, with the result that agencies, engineers and masons have learned important skills for continued use in future.

With 13,891 completed there have been important lessons learned to inform the continued development of further programmes, including how to gain greater efficiencies, how to scale up, and how to strengthen institutional mechanisms.



Morne Hercule, housing rehabilitation and reconstruction area

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Retrofitting works at Villa Rosa

© Build Change

3. Housing Reconstruction

Housing reconstruction progress was also limited during the first two years of recovery. There were several contributing factors; including the scale and concentration of damage, the levels of displacement and a series of crises after the initial disaster, low incomes, high proportions of tenants and rental buildings, and a complex urban, political and institutional environment. Among the greatest constraints has been the availability of funding for reconstruction. This is compounded by the lack of a government housing reconstruction policy. In the absence of policy directives, donors and implementing agencies who started or planned housing projects have employed a range of approaches, activities and budgets. This fact is important when considering the numbers reported. The numbers reported therefore reflect a range of housing interventions. By the end of 2010 1179 permanent houses were constructed. By June 2011 this rose to 4006 constructed of 11697 committed. At the end of 2011 this figure had increased to 5189 completed of 15224 committed.

Note:

The figures reported do not include the activities and commitments by AFD, 16 / 6, the World Bank, USAID, IDB and other major stakeholders.

Furthermore, as with reporting on repairs, the figures also do not include the large number of families who have started or completed their own construction or reconstruction with their own resources, with or without technical advice or assistance.

■ Participation

32 agencies reported housing activities realised or committed. 20 of the 28 agencies involved in housing repairs and retrofitting are also involved in permanent housing activities. The combination of repairs and construction reflects area based programmes which usually evolved from initial shelter or pre earthquake development activities in the same areas and with the same communities. Many area based agencies and programmes include multi sectoral support including debris clearance, water and sanitation, infrastructure and livelihoods initiatives. 14 of the 32 reporting agencies have plans to construct or support the construction of less than 200 houses each. This includes a number of small church based groups. There are further small groups and projects which have not been reported as the agencies tended to operate outside of the cluster coordination mechanism.

Of the agencies involved in shelter support during 2010 and 2011, some operated only with an emergency shelter mandate and closed their programmes or went back to non-shelter focused activities. A large number also started in shelter, with the intention to also support housing repairs and reconstruction but have struggled to fund the longer term reconstruction activities.

■ Costs

There is a wide variation in the cost of programmes supporting housing reconstruction reflecting variation in approaches: site development works, services provided, house size and specifications, training and other activities. Scope: A number of direct provision projects include the cost of land purchase and development of infrastructure. Others are based on supporting owners in situ, and therefore do not have land costs, but may include rehabilitation or upgrading of infrastructure or services. Agencies supporting housing reconstruction in neighbourhoods on steep hills are often investing in site preparation works in advance in order to have a safer site for house construction. The majority of agencies are providing sanitation as an imperative in housing construction, whether for individual households or communal. This coordination shows an improvement from the shelter phase.

Overheads: One of the widest variations is not in the scope of construction works, but in the range and cost of technical support activities. Overheads vary widely with resulting variations in overall budgets. In 2011 many agencies invested considerable resources into project development, particularly in the absence of housing policies, strategies and common methodologies or tools. This investment yielded valuable lessons learned and resources for wider use, but subsequent stages of implementation will need to operate more efficiently to be replicable and to optimise the overall funding and human resources available.

Subsidy: Experience over the last decade in housing reconstruction programmes shows that financial assistance is optimised when it used to supplement, leverage and condition private resources, as part of a combined technical and financial support programme. This implies the total cost of the house is the subsidy plus the owner's investment. However, the majority of housing reconstruction projects implemented in Haiti so far assume the full burden of the cost is on the agency, thereby increasing the agency costs.

■ Eligibility / other issues

There is to date no Government policy to confirm eligibility for housing construction or housing reconstruction. Therefore there is also no confirmation of the overall numbers (and budgets required). The Government needs to urgently review the scenario options for eligibility in order to underpin overall programming, budgeting and targeting. The majority of agencies have already or plan to support families from houses which were completely destroyed or were damaged beyond repair (usually but not necessarily 'red' tagged houses). This support is more likely to be for property owners than renters, although there are projects assisting relocation from camps for those who were not necessarily property owners.

Projects involving comprehensive new site development not associated with affected communities in the same area, are

finding selection and relocation of beneficiaries, and terms and conditions for allocation difficult to resolve.

Rental: A high proportion of households directly affected by the earthquake were renters. A high proportion of those currently accommodated in camps include renters who were not directly affected by the earthquake, but may have been affected by rising rents and living costs or other indirect impacts. There is no Government rental reconstruction strategy to date, or projects targeting rental reconstruction, which would help increase the supply of rental housing and stabilise the rents. Some agencies are using rental subsidies, stimulating the rental market, but this is not linked to directly leverage or condition standards in reconstruction.

■ Implementation

STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY:

The MTPTC issued guidance for construction of houses and small buildings in 2010. The guidance is consistent with standards used in other earthquake risk countries, and based on improving the previous commonly practised confined masonry technique. Other techniques have been validated in project related contexts, but the MTPTC is promoting confined masonry as the authorised technique for general use, for training and for public information. Unlike in many other post disaster situations improving construction is not premised on introducing completely new technology or materials, but on improving design, material quality and workmanship, along with the systems for quality assurance. Efforts to import new materials and technologies including structural insulated panels, steel frames, and other options have not been widely adopted by agencies carrying out new construction, or by the market. Many are relatively expensive, or require specialised equipment or skills, or mass production, and most are suitable for modular construction rather than housing for the highly variable dense urban reconstruction sites. Supply driven middle income solutions are not likely to gain traction in a predominantly low income market.

Local and traditional technologies prevail in rural areas, and have benefited from research and development work to improve their durability, cyclone and earthquake resistance. Housing standards and guidance in both conventional and local technologies includes norms for sanitation, and options to incorporate building improvements such as rainwater harvesting.

T-SHELTERS:

The majority of T-shelters provided by agencies since 2010 were based on timber frames of steel box or angle section frames. In rural areas where the local traditional construction types include single storey timber frames with woven or low strength masonry infill in small panels, there have been appropriate measures developed to upgrade the T-shelters to a similar permanent construction type. However, the promotion of upgrading measures in urban areas carries significant risks and requires technical guidance by the concerned authorities. The risks include adding block

masonry enclosure to T-shelter frames as unconfined infill or with inadequate foundations, inadequate reinforcement of the masonry, and not anticipating extensions for additional storeys in future. Guidance is needed for households to avoid carrying out inappropriate and unsafe 'improvement' measures. The majority of T-shelters have already been built to a good standard for their original purpose and should provide adequate accommodation for several years, as they are, with basic maintenance and repairs if necessary. Investing further in 'upgrading' T-shelters does not result in compliant permanent construction to the approved urban standards and diverts resources that would better be invested for permanent, durable and compliant construction including optimal plan area and layout, correct site preparation and foundations, adequate reinforcement and planning for additional storeys.



T-shelters constructed at Ravine Pintade

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APPROACHES:

The range of approaches in new housing construction currently includes:

- New site development and new house construction directly by agency staff / teams.
- New site development and new house construction directly by agency selected contractors
- Existing site, new house construction by agency staff / teams
- Existing site, new house construction by agency selected contractors
- Existing site, new house construction by owner selected contractors / local labour with technical and financial support by agencies.
- Upgrading of agency provided T-shelter to more durable construction, with or without agency technical and financial support.
- New extensions to existing buildings.

In the majority of projects decisions about building design, scope of works, specification, selection of materials, selection of boss masons and costs are determined by the agency, with varying degrees of consultation with the households. At one end of the spectrum, houses are built before beneficiaries are selected and therefore with no input, including on location. At the other end, there are projects based on owner driven models, where the family makes the key decisions and is

responsible for the work. While there is guidance from the Government of Haiti on building standards, there is not an official direction on the financial subsidy or the cost of houses. Some projects have been reviewed by the IHRC, but others have been developed independently.

OWNER DRIVEN:

While a subsidy can leverage some degree of private funding in repair and retrofitting, it is relatively difficult to encourage low income owners to contribute to retrofitting costs, especially if the building is already habitable. On the other hand, post disaster experience shows that a very high proportion of families will invest private resources along with the financial assistance available as a subsidy in reconstruction or new construction if the programme is well designed.

Haven piloted a programme of owner driven construction in Cabaret, based on conditional stage payments of financial assistance and supported by technical assistance. Despite concerns that the advance funds disbursed may not be used for housing, they found that not only the agency funds but also private funds were used for the construction. This approach has several advantages: the burden of full construction cost is shared, agency funds can therefore reach more families, the financial assistance can be conditioned to incentivise compliance with standards as compared to a supervising compliance model, the financial assistance can condition not only the agency funds but help to ensure all resources are used to build to the right standard.

Agencies who have piloted owner driven construction have also found the families concerned managed to build for lower costs than the agency could do directly themselves, usually due to savings in transport, staffing and overheads. It is important to learn from the recent pilot experience in terms of the design of tranche payments, terms and conditions, links to technical assistance, compliance and certification and the management of financial disbursement.

New Site Developments: A number of agencies proposed to develop new sites and housing to address the needs of those who had lost their homes in the earthquake. Many assumed this would be easier to implement, offering efficiencies in infrastructure, standardisation of housing units, easier contracting and supervision. However, they usually found multiple difficulties in the acquisition and development of land, whether allocated by authorities or purchased through the market, including status, cost, preparation or servicing. The houses constructed have been to a range of sizes, specifications and costs, sometimes meeting expectations of donors, beneficiaries, communities and authorities, sometimes not, depending on the houses and the levels of expectations. The selection of beneficiaries, the terms and conditions for transfer of houses and the terms and conditions related to land and infrastructure has been resolved in a range of mechanisms. While there may have been an expectation that this would be a large scale solution to reconstruction, including relocation from hazardous areas, it has not been without challenges, and some agencies have

reconsidered or recalibrated their original intentions. Plans for new sites and settlements have also been affected by the overall limitations in funding available for reconstruction.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, CAPACITY AND TRAINING:

The range of approaches and implementation methodologies has a range of implications in terms of technical support. In direct contractor work, there may or may not be training activities, or awareness activities for households. Where there are training activities, the curricula and standard of training delivery varies widely. There are agencies specialising in training and technical advice for other implementing agencies including for example Build Change, SDC, Emergency Architects and Architecture for Humanity for safer construction, planning and other activities.

The MTPTC has initiated a framework to improve the quality, consistency and coverage of training for safer construction, to be developed over the coming months, in parallel with a communication strategy to maximise awareness activities. In many NGO project areas, it has been observed that agencies are primarily concerned with quality assurance in the buildings they directly support but are less concerned with adopting a wider area based responsibility for the safety and quality of construction of all houses in their operational area. While the approach may be community based, it is often selective within that community. The issue of technical support for self-reconstruction and repair in NGO project areas needs to be reviewed.

NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

The context for housing reconstruction includes many areas with physical risks, deficits in basic services, and other urban planning needs. The destruction caused in January 2010 provides an opportunity not only to rebuild better and safer houses, but to rebuild safer and better neighbourhoods. Many donors and NGOs are planning or implementing measures to improve basic services, particularly water and sanitation, as well as improving circulation, access to open space and reducing slope related risks. In some projects, these works evolved from shelter support, rehabilitation and livelihoods support programmes. In others, they followed planning processes.

It is likely that housing construction or housing support programmes means reconstruction of safer buildings, but reinstates other deficiencies, missing opportunities to address infrastructure or risk issues or potential for restructuring. This is particularly a risk in areas of unsupported spontaneous construction.

There are also areas where there is significant potential for development and growth, including moving from small scale buildings, to higher density with associated services. Housing reconstruction and neighbourhood development programmes need to consider such opportunities rather than simply replacing the previous accommodation with safer construction. This will have implications in the detailed planning of technical and financial assistance models for reconstruction.

Note on geographical progress

For geographical disaggregation of the data collected on commune basis see full data by agency and commune. The tagging of houses as red, yellow or green in assessments of safety in 2010 has been explained above, noting that it was not intended to determine the works for repair and reconstruction. However, it provides an important indicator of the proportion and distribution of damage and affected households.

The total number of buildings assessed as damaged in the three main geographical zones by MTPTC¹ as follows:

Sud Est:	3,212 assessed damaged
Axe les Palmes:	16,695 assessed damaged
Zone Metropolitaine de Port-Au-Prince:	154,324 assessed damaged
Total:	174,231 assessed damaged

The figures reported show areas of faster and slower progress in repair and reconstruction.

The Sud Est shows over 1471 houses completed, and 1583 repaired, reflecting a faster recovery in areas of lighter damage, and in rural areas and smaller towns where the process of reconstruction is less complex than in parts of Port au Prince for example. Progress has also been faster in Leogane commune, the epicentre and most affected area of Axe les Palmes. This was partly due to the higher proportion of agencies and funding available in Leogane.

In the metropolitan area, ZMPAP progress in reconstruction

for agencies has been limited, 1333 houses completed, less than in the Sud Est despite the vast difference in levels of damage, but there has been better progress in repairs in the metropolitan area, 8176 repaired to the end of 2011. The distribution of repairs in the ZMPAP shows a concentration to date in the commune of Delmas 6,008 coinciding with single large projects and major agency activity. The outstanding repair commitments in the city are concentrated in Carrefour and Port Au Prince communes. The poor progress in construction reflects the complexity of working in the urban area, including the need for planning and infrastructure considerations, a high proportion of rental buildings which are not being reconstructed and lay outside of the realm of usual NGO activities and other concerns.

These observations only refer to the agency reported figures and activities. It is important to note that repairs, reconstruction and new construction by families themselves also show areas of faster and slower progress. Rural areas have recovered more rapidly due to people remaining in situ, the type of construction and fewer constraints. Construction activity in the city has taken place in existing damaged neighbourhoods but has accelerated rapidly in new areas on the mountains to the south, Morne L'Hopital and the foothills to the north of the city at Canaan and Jerusalem. The tracking of self-construction has not been addressed by implementing agencies particularly when it takes place outside of officially damaged neighbourhoods.

The next phase of housing support including repairs and reconstruction will need to strengthen information management systems, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, in order to inform decision making and to enable the Haitian authorities to better lead the reconstruction.



Self reconstruction: new house at Canaan.

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Self reconstruction: new development above Jalousie

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¹ Note: Damage assessment coverage was partial in certain communes, damage figures may therefore be higher.

Sud Est: Baintet, Cayes-Jacmel, Cote-de-Fer, Jacmel, Marigot, La Vallee de Jacmel, Anse-A-Pitre:

Axe les Palmes: Gressier, Leogane, Petit Goave, Grand Goave:

Zone Metropolitaine de Port-Au-Prince: Carrefour, Cite Soleil, Croix Des Bouquets, Delmas, Petion Ville, Port-Au-Prince, Tabarre:

Conclusion:

We would like to thank all the “Logement-Quartiers” partners who provided data and feedback allowing UN-Habitat to prepare this analysis. We hope that this document will help partners in their programming and operations. The document will be submitted to the Unité de Construction du Logement et des Bâtiments Publics in order to inform their decision-making process, especially in relation to the development of a housing reconstruction policy and mechanisms to coordinate and guide implementing partners.

This document and further information are available at www.onuhabitat.org/haiti